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Abstract 
Most treatments of the Great Depression have focused on its onset and its aftermath. 
In contrast, we take a unified view of the interwar period. We look at the slide into 
and the emergence from the 1920-21 recession and the roaring 1920s boom, as well as 
the slide into the Great Depression after 1929, and attempt to explain these phenom-
ena in a unified framework. The model framework combines monopolistic product 
market competition with search frictions and bargaining in the labor market, allowing 
for both individual and collective (unionized) wage bargaining. We attribute the ex-
traordinary macroeconomic and financial volatility of this period to two factors: Shifts 
in the wage bargaining regime and in the degree of monopoly power in the economy. 
The pro-union provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914 contributed to the slide in asset 
prices and the depression of 1920-21, while a series of tough anti-union Supreme 
Court decisions in late 1921 and 1922 coupled with the lax anti-trust enforcement of 
the Coolidge and Hoover administrations enabled a major rise in corporate profits and 
stock market valuations throughout the 1920s. Landmark court decisions in favor of 
trade unions in the late 1920s, as well as political pressure on firms to adopt the wel-
fare capitalism model of high wages, made the economy increasingly susceptible to 
collapsing profit expectations. We model the onset of the great depression as an 
equilibrium switch from individual wage bargaining to (actual or mimicked) 
collective wage bargaining. The general equilibrium effects of this regime change are 
consistent with large decreases in output, employment, and stock prices.  
 
Keywords:  Trade unions, collective bargaining, Great Depression 
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I. Introduction 
The period between World War I and the New Deal was a time of extraordinary mac-
roeconomic volatility. This short time span was punctuated by two sharp recessions, 
separated by a long and sustained expansion. Particularly puzzling has been the be-
havior of asset markets, first falling sharply until 1921, then rising to hitherto unheard 
of heights, before crashing precipitously in 1929 and beyond.  
 Most treatments of this era have focused on the Great Depression and its af-
termath. In contrast, we take a unified view of the interwar period. We look at the 
slide into and the emergence from the 1920 recession and the roaring 1920s boom, as 
well as the slide into the Great Depression after 1929, and attempt to explain these 
phenomena in a unified framework. 
 We propose a new paradigm for the explanation of large shifts in asset prices 
and macro aggregates. This paradigm is based not upon transitory shocks but rather 
upon low-frequency shifts between steady states. Each steady state is characterized by 
one of two labor bargaining regimes, individual or collective, and is easily understood 
from first principles.  
The first contribution of this paper is to link collective bargaining in labor 
markets to the value of equity. As is well known, if firms have monopoly power in 
their product markets, collective bargaining in the labor market allows unions to ap-
propriate a share of the firms’ monopoly rents. In contrast, workers who bargain indi-
vidually with their employers cannot influence the firm’s pricing and quantity deci-
sions. Hence, they do not have the bargaining power to extract part of their em-
ployer’s monopoly rents. For this reason, firms’ profits under monopolistic product 
market competition will be substantially affected by the labor market regime, with 
drastic consequences for asset prices. A switch from an individual bargaining (laissez-
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faire) labor market to one dominated by rent-sharing unions will cause firms’ profits 
and equity values to drop sharply. Conversely, any change in the legal framework im-
peding the ability of unions to bargain collectively will lead to an increase in firms’ 
profits and equity values. 
 With this background, we link the long slide in the stock market between 1914 
and 1921 to the enactment of the Clayton Act in October of 1914. Section 6 of the 
Clayton Act states that antitrust laws are not applicable to labor organizations1, which 
greatly expanded the ability of labor unions to organize and bargain collectively. This 
favorable environment for collective bargaining led to a marked increase in union ac-
tivity, as measured by trade union membership and strike activity. At the same time, 
this regime switch to collective bargaining led to a sharp downward shift in firm 
valuations. Indeed, between the 2nd quarter of 1914 and the 3rd quarter of 1921, the 
Standard&Poor’s 500 lost nearly half of its value. 
Both this renaissance of organized labor and the long-term decline in the stock 
market were brought to an abrupt end, however, by a series of Supreme Court rulings 
in late 1921 and 1922 that declared the pro-union provisions of the Clayton Act un-
constitutional. The arguing of the first of these, the Tri-City Trades case2 and Truax v. 
Corrigan3, before the Supreme Court coincides neatly with the end of the long 1914-
                                                 
1 The text of Section 6 of the Clayton Act famously states: “The labor of a human being is not 
a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be con-
strued to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted 
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members 
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
under the antitrust laws.” 
2 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council et al., No. 2, 257 U.S. 184, 
reargued October 4-5, 1921 and decided December 5, 1921. 
3 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 No. 13, reargued October 5-6, 1921, decided December 19, 
1921.  
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1921 slide in asset prices4, and indeed marks the advent of the long, sustained asset 
price boom which would peak in 1929. In this paper, we will relate the first part of the 
stock market boom of the 1920’s to the waning of trade union influence: As firms 
shifted from collective back to individual bargaining, firm profits should increase, 
causing an upsurge in stock prices.  
 We also discuss the role that a landmark pro-union Supreme Court ruling, the 
Texas and New Orleans Railways case5, may have played in the stock market crash of 
1929. The Texas and N.O. Railways case marked a reversal in the Supreme Court’s 
stance on unions and set an important legal precedent, upholding unions’ right to 
choose their own representation when bargaining under the Railway Labor Act of 
1926. It was this Supreme Court ruling that paved the way for the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932 limiting the use of injunctions against unions, and ultimately for the New 
Deal legislation. Contemporary observers placed great emphasis on the importance of 
this ruling for the labor movement. As Berman (1930) wrote in the American Eco-
nomic Review: 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Texas and N.O. Railroad case is 
without doubt one of the most important rendered in a labor case in 
many years. Considered as a whole, it may be regarded as a great vic-
tory for organized labor. … It puts the Supreme Court on record in fa-
vor of legislation designed to promote collective bargaining. It prom-
ises that the court will, in the future, be more friendly to state and fed-
eral legislation designed to protect workers from the coercive activities 
of anti-union employers. ” 
                                                 
4 Although World War I and related disturbances certainly had some impact on stock prices, it 
is not clear why that impact should have been so profoundly negative. By comparison, both 
indices gained substantial ground during World War II. 
5 Texas and New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 
U.S. 548. 
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In addition, further court rulings and legislative efforts at the state and federal level on 
the eve of the Great Depression indicated that the tide had begun to turn in the favor 
of unions. If these political and judicial developments affected expectations on the 
likelihood of a switch back to collective bargaining, then investors would have ration-
ally expected firm profits to decline sharply, depressing stock prices. 
The second contribution of this paper is to link labor bargaining institutions 
and macroeconomic performance in the interwar period. In particular, the interplay of 
a firm with monopoly power in the goods markets and a monopolistic supplier of la-
bor leads to a restriction of output below the socially efficient level, with the corre-
sponding macroeconomic effects. In the body of the paper, we will make these argu-
ments more specific in the context of a general equilibrium model of monopolistic 
product market competition with search frictions and a choice of bargaining regimes 
(union or individual) in the labor market, similar to that analyzed in Ebell and Haefke 
(2006). We find that the shift from individual to collective bargaining is associated 
with a sharp drop in output, an equally sharp increase in unemployment and a moder-
ate increases in real wages. This replicates nicely the behavior of macroeconomic ag-
gregates during both the 1920-21 and the 1929-33 downturns, in particular the other-
wise somewhat puzzling behavior of wages. Conversely, a shift from collective to in-
dividual bargaining, such as that in the wake of the Tri-City Trades and Truax rulings 
of 1921, should lead to an increase in output and a decrease in unemployment, such as 
those observed during the upswing beginning in the 4th Quarter of 1921.  
In independent work, Ohanian (2006) has also come to the conclusion that in-
stitutional changes in the labor market were instrumental in causing the Great Depres-
sion. His model differs substantially from ours, however, as it does not involve search 
or explicit bargaining in the labor market. Rather, Ohanian (2006) emphasizes that 
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firms would have found it optimal to reduce firm size (and hence employment) in or-
der to avoid being targeted by unions, who by assumption concentrated their organi-
zation efforts on larger firms. He also carefully rules out competing explanations such 
as monetary, banking, taxation and productivity shocks, since all either occur too late 
(in the case of monetary and banking shocks, in 1931) or are too small to account for 
the magnitude and timing of the sharp declines in output and employment from the 4th 
quarter of 1929 through the 2nd quarter of 1931.  
 Our work is also related to that of Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004). For the 
New Deal and the 1930s, they have argued forcefully that collective bargaining in the 
labor market, in conjunction with a lax anti-trust stance, as well as the institutional 
protection both received under the Wagner Act of 1935, were key in contributing to 
the persistence of unemployment in the U.S. throughout the 1930s. This interpretation 
has been applied successfully to other countries, see Cole and Ohanian (2002) for the 
UK, Beaudry and Portier (2002) for France, and Fisher and Hornstein (2002) for 
Germany. Our work is similar in spirit to that of Cole and Ohanian, in the sense that 
our analysis also builds upon the interaction of collective bargaining and monopoly 
power. Once again, however, the modeling differs substantially. Cole and Ohanian’s 
model of bargaining in the labor market is specifically tailored to New Deal era legis-
lation, while our model of the labor market is more general and more explicit. We 
embed a Mortensen-Pissarides search framework, which leads to fully microfounded 
involuntary unemployment, in a model of monopolistic competition in the goods mar-
ket. Within this framework we consider two bargaining regimes, individual and col-
lective, between which workers are able to choose optimally.  
In addition, our work is related to a large body of previous work on stock mar-
ket crashes. Explanations of stock market crashes have largely been behavioral and 
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have focused primarily on the crash of 1929. Research by Rappoport and White 
(1993) argued that a stock market bubble on the New York Stock Exchange existed, 
where prices outpaced dividends. Together with a financial frictions and debt-
deflation view, this has contributed to a conventional view of the depression in which 
stock market exuberance fuelled by lax monetary policy, excessive monetary tighten-
ing in 1929, and pernicious real effects of banking panics play a prominent role, see 
Bernanke (1983), Bernanke (1995), Bernanke (2000), as well as Bordo, Erceg and 
Evans (2000) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003). Our interpretation leaves 
room for a stock market bubble in 1929, but attributes the long stock market boom 
from 1921 to 1928 to the interaction between an increase in monopoly power due to 
lax anti-trust enforcement during the Coolidge administration and the emasculation of 
labor unions in the wake of the Truax v. Corrigan and Tri-City Trades rulings.  
 A more neoclassical explanation for 1929 and the ensuing slump has argued 
for tax wedges, as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), Chari, Kehoe and McGrat-
tan (2006), or adverse productivity shocks, as in Cole, Ohanian and Leung (2005), 
while rejecting the stock market overvaluation hypothesis, see McGrattan and Pres-
cott (2004). In particular, the business cycle accounting approach of Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan (2006) points to a prominent role for the labor wedge, in accordance with 
our findings. 
 Our work on asset pricing is loosely related to that of Danthine and Donaldson 
(2002), who examine the impact of fluctuations in bargaining power on the risk-
sharing arrangements between workers and firms. There are three main distinctions to 
our work: First, we focus not on fluctuations in bargaining power under a single wage 
bargaining setup, but rather on shifts between two distinct wage bargaining frame-
works, each associated with a distinct steady state. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the impact on asset prices we describe has nothing to do with risk-
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portantly, the impact on asset prices we describe has nothing to do with risk-sharing. 
In fact, we will employ a setup in which all agents are risk neutral, so that firm values 
are simply the discounted sum of expected profits. Thirdly, we do not impose the re-
striction that workers may not own firms, so that limited participation in asset markets 
plays no role here. 
 Further, our work is similar in spirit to a recent literature discussing product 
market competition as a source of divergent labor market performance between 
Europe and the US in the 1980s and 1990s, cf. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), 
Fonseca, Lopez and Pissarides (2001) and Ebell and Haefke (2005, 2006).  
 Lax antitrust policies during the 1920s and possible increases in monopoly 
power have been noted in previous research, notably by Bittlingmayer (1992), who 
argues for a link with the booming stock market of the 1920s. While we concur with 
his explanation of the stock market upswing of the 1920s, our results offer an alterna-
tive interpretation of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression. Ac-
cording to Bittlingmayer, threats of tighter antitrust enforcement in 1929 led to lower 
profit expectations and thus contributed to the fall in asset values. However, tighter 
antitrust enforcement should have led to an expansion, not a contraction, in output 
while asset prices fell. In our framework, asset prices may fall for two reasons: both 
expectations of declining monopoly power and of a switch from individual to collec-
tive wage bargaining will erode monopoly rents. While in the first case, an increase in 
output will accompany the stock market crash, in the second case, output and stock 
market values would decline in concert.  
 In addition, if firms’ monopoly power were higher in 1929 than in 1920, then 
the drop in output due to an expected switch to collective bargaining would also have 
been greater. This would explain why the two depressions of the 1920s may have had 
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similar causes, yet differed in severity. This also meshes nicely with Cole and Oha-
nian (2004)’s argument that it was the combination of lax anti-trust enforcement and 
collective bargaining which caused the depression of the 1930s to be so persistent.  
The remaining parts of the paper are structured as follows. The following sec-
tion outlines the theoretical underpinnings of our reasoning. Section III reviews labor 
and antitrust policy during the 1920s and highlights the continuity hypothesis between 
this period and the New Deal advanced in recent historical research. Section IV pre-
sents the results of a quantitative general equilibrium analysis of the 1920s. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Monopolistic competition and labor market frictions  
In order to address the interplay between monopoly power and organized labor theo-
retically, two model elements are crucial. First, the goods market must allow for mo-
nopolistic competition. Second, there must be wage bargaining, allowing for two bar-
gaining regimes: collective bargaining (organized labor) and individual bargaining. 
These model elements are integrated into as parsimonious a model setup as possible, 
in which agents are risk neutral, labor supply is inelastic and there is no capital. We 
assume that regime changes are unexpected.  
 
A. Stock market valuations 
Agents are risk-neutral, so that the value of a firm is simply the discounted sum of 
expected future dividends 
∑∞
=
+=
1
,
τ
τ
τβ tktt dEp  
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where τ+tkd ,  are the firm’s date τ+t  dividends under bargaining regime k, with 
{ }ICk ,∈ , representing collective and individual bargaining respectively. When 
agents expect the bargaining regime to be permanent, and in the absence of other 
shocks, the value of the firm becomes 
kk dp β
β
−= 1       (1) 
Clearly, the firm’s valuation is proportional to the period profits associated with each 
bargaining regime. If period profits are higher under individual bargaining – as will be 
the case – then asset prices will be proportionately higher as well. 
 
B. Labor Search 
The first crucial element of the model is the explicit assumption of a labor market 
which allows for two types of wage formation: collective and individual bargaining. 
Wage bargaining is underpinned by Mortensen-Pissarides search frictions in the labor 
market, which create rents. In particular, unemployed workers U and vacancies V are 
transformed into job matches by a constant returns to scale matching function 
 ( ) ηη −= 1, VsUVUm  
where η  is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment and s 
is a scaling factor. Job matches are separated at the exogenous rate χ. Key variables 
are the aggregate labor market tightness, defined as 
U
V=θ , the rate at which firms fill 
vacancies ( ) ( ) ηθθ −== s
V
VUmq , , and the rate at which workers find jobs 
( ) ( ) ηθθ −== 1, s
U
VUmf . The key intuition is that the greater the number of vacancies 
relative to unemployed workers (i.e. the higher is tightness), the easier it is for firms 
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to fill vacancies, and the more difficult it is for workers to find jobs.  In the steady- 
state, the flow of workers into and out of unemployment must be equal, leading to a 
Beveridge curve relating equilibrium unemployment to tightness: 
( ) ( ) ( )θχ
χχθ
f
UUfU +=⇒−=⋅ 1  
 
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers on the unit interval.6 Value functions for 
unemployed and employed workers are defined as follows7: 
( ), ,1 11E k k E k UV w V Vr χ χ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦+      (2) 
( )( ) ( ) ,1 11U k U k E kV b f V f Vr θ θ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦+     (3) 
The value of employment under bargaining regime k is the period real wage wk, plus 
the expected continuation value of current employment. In calculating the expected 
continuation value, workers take into account that they will lose their jobs with prob-
ability χ 8. Similarly, the value of unemployment is the real flow value to unemploy-
ment b (which includes the value of home production and of any unemployment bene-
fits or charitable assistance), plus the continuation value of unemployment. This con-
tinuation value takes into account the possibility of finding a job, which occurs with 
probability ( )kf θ .  
                                                 
6 For simplicity, there is neither capital nor savings in the model.  
7 These are steady-state values. Steady-state bargaining in a setting without shocks is standard 
in the labor search and matching literature, cf. Pissarides (2001). 
8 We follow Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), who argue that the cyclical variation in separa-
tions is small enough so as to justify the assumption of a constant separation rate. 
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From the worker’s value functions, we can derive the worker’s surplus ,W kV  
for each bargaining regime k as the difference between the values of employment and 
unemployment.  
( )
,
1 k U
W k
r w rV
V
r χ
+ −= +      (4) 
 
C. Monopolistic Competition 
We assume the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setup. There is a con-
tinuum of firms on the unit interval, each producing a differentiated good indexed by 
i. Agents are risk neutral in the aggregate consumption good and have Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences over the continuum of differentiated goods. Demand for goods in each 
period is derived from the household's optimization problem: 
,
1 1
,max i nc i nc di
σ
σ σ
σ
− −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  
subject to the budget constraint , in i n
pI c di
P
= ∫ , where nI denotes the real income of 
household n and ,i nc  is household n's consumption of good i. Thus we obtain aggre-
gate demand for good i given as: 
   ( ), ii i n p yy c dn YP
σ−⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫      (5) 
where nY I dn= ∫  is aggregate real income and ( ) 11 1iP P σ σ− −= ∫  is the inverse shadow 
price of wealth, typically interpreted as a price index. Equation (5) is the standard 
monopolistic-competition demand function where σ  is the demand elasticity facing 
the firm. Monopoly power is measured by this demand elasticity. The lower is de-
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mand elasticity, the steeper is the demand curve facing the firm and the greater is the 
firm’s monopoly power. Perfect competition is the special case in which demand elas-
ticity approaches infinity, leading to a flat demand curve and hence price-taking be-
havior. 
 
D. The Firm’s Problem 
In the presence of search frictions, firms cannot adjust employment instantaneously. 
Rather, in order to hire a worker at date t +1, firms must pay κ to post each of vt va-
cancies at date t which are filled at rate qt. At the same time, the firm’s ‘stock’ of 
hired workers depreciates each period at constant rate χ, representing an exogenous 
quit rate. Hence, the firm’s stock of hired workers behaves like a capital stock with a 
linear adjustment cost.  
 The choice of bargaining regime has a profound impact on the firm’s problem. 
Under individual bargaining, firms retain the right to choose employment optimally, 
and bargaining is over wages only. Since it takes one period for a vacancy to be con-
verted into a hire, the current employment level is fixed at the time of wage bargain-
ing. Hence, the firm chooses employment in advance while taking the impact on fu-
ture wage bargaining outcomes into account. 
 Under collective bargaining, both employment and wages are subject to nego-
tiation. As a result, the firm makes no choices unilaterally, and only posts enough va-
cancies to implement the bargained employment level.  
 
1. Individual Bargaining Firms 
Individual bargaining firms choose vacancies optimally in order to maximize the pre-
sent discounted value of future profits 
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( ) ( ) ( )1max '
1
I
I I v I I I I I I
p y
V h y w h v V h
P r
κ⎧ ⎫= − ⋅ − +⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭
 
subject to: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
' 1
I I
I I I
I I
p y y
P Y
h h q v
w w h
σ
χ θ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − +
=
 
The last constraint anticipates that individually bargained wages may depend upon the 
firm’s steady-state factor choice hI. 9 
 The firm’s first order condition for vacancies equalizes the discounted value of 
a marginal worker to the cost of hiring that worker: 
( )
( )
'
'
I I
I
V h
h q
κβ θ
∂ =∂        (6) 
The cost of hiring a worker is simply the product of vacancy cost κ and the number of 
vacancies which must be opened to hire one worker, ( )θq
1 . The envelope condition 
gives the value of the marginal worker to the firm: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1I II I I
I I
p y wV A w h h
h P q h
σ κχσ θ
∂∂ −= − + − −∂ ∂   (7) 
Equation (7) will be useful in the treatment of wage bargaining in the following sub-
section, as it gives the firm's surplus in the individual bargaining problem. Combining 
(6) with the envelope condition (7) yields the firm's Euler equation for employment: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
' '1 1 ' ' 1
1 ' '
I I
I I I
I
p y wA w h h
q r P h q
κ σ κχθ σ θ
⎡ ⎤∂−= − − + −⎢ ⎥+ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (8)  
                                                 
9 Note that under individual bargaining, the firm’s employment stock hI is fixed in the previ-
ous period, and hence is fixed at the time of bargaining. Hence, the firm sets employment 
in advance, while taking into account the future strategic implications of this choice for the 
wage bargaining. Cf. Smith (1999). 
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This Euler equation describes the firm's optimal employment decision. The left hand 
side represents the current period cost of hiring the marginal worker, which is equal to 
the cost per vacancy κ  multiplied by the number of vacancies necessary to hire a 
worker ( )θq
1 . The right hand side represents the discounted future benefits to hiring 
the marginal worker: The first two terms in brackets are standard, representing the 
worker's marginal revenue product net of wages. The third term, ''
'
I
I
I
wh
h
∂
∂ , reflects 
firms' correct anticipation that the result of wage bargaining will depend upon the 
number of workers hired. In section II.E.2. we will connect this third term to the hir-
ing externality. The fourth term in brackets represents the future savings in hiring 
costs from having hired the worker today, discounted by the separation probability χ. 
 
2. Collective Bargaining Firms 
The collective bargaining firm does not solve an optimization problem as such. Effi-
cient collective bargaining involves bargaining over both wages and employment, de-
termining both next period’s employment and wage, and hence output. As a result, 
there is no choice which is made unilaterally by the firm, except to mechanically 
choose the number of vacancies which will implement the negotiated employment 
level 'Ch  according to the transition function: 
( ) ( )' 1C C Ch h v qχ θ= − +  
The steady-state value of the collective bargaining firm is simply the discounted pre-
sent value of a constant stream of profits: 
( ) ( ) ( ),
1 C
J C C C C C C
C
p yrV h y w h h
r P q
κχ θ
⎡ ⎤+= − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   (9) 
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where ( )
C
C
C
hv
q
χ
θ=  represents the firm’s steady-state vacancy-posting rate. 
 
E. Wage Bargaining 
Search frictions imply that rents to employment arise, which firms and workers divide 
by Nash bargaining. We consider two bargaining frameworks. Collective bargaining 
occurs when all workers of a firm band together to bargain with their employer over 
both wages and employment. Under individual bargaining, each worker negotiates 
separately with his or her employer and wages can be renegotiated at any time.10 The 
crucial distinction between the two bargaining regimes is that under this latter indi-
vidual setup, each worker is treated as the marginal worker. The reason is that when 
negotiating with his employer, a worker’s only threat point is to leave the firm’s em-
ployment himself – not to take any other workers with him – making himself the mar-
ginal worker during wage negotiations. In contrast, under collective bargaining, 
workers can act jointly to shut down production in the event of a disagreement. The 
second distinction between the two frameworks is whether employment levels are 
subject to negotiation. Under efficient collective bargaining, workers have sufficient 
leverage to bargain over the firm’s total employment level, while it is assumed that an 
individual worker does not. 
 
1. Collective Bargaining 
The surplus over which the employer and the union are bargaining is the difference 
between profits when negotiations are successful and when they fail. Under collective 
bargaining, the workers are able to prevent the firm from operating if negotiations 
                                                 
10 The individual bargaining framework examined here was introduced in partial equilibrium 
by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b), and extended to general equilibrium by Smith 
(1999), Cahuc, Wasmer and Marque (2004) and Ebell and Haefke (2005).  
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fail, so that the firm’s surplus is equal to total firm profits, or equivalently its total 
value given by (9)11 The workers’ surplus is the difference between the value of em-
ployment with the collective-bargaining firm and unemployment (4), multiplied by 
the number of workers hC.12  
( )
,
1 C U
W C C C
r w rV
V h h
r χ
+ −= +  
Hence, the Nash bargaining problem becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
1 1max ln 1 ln
C C
C U C
w h C C C C C
r w rV p yrh y w h h
r r P q
κφ φ χχ θ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − +⎪ ⎪+ − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎨ ⎬+ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎩ ⎭
 
where worker’s bargaining power is given by φ .13 
The first-order conditions with respect to the wage and to employment are: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
11
C
C U
C
C
p yrw V A
r P q
p y
w A
P q
κφ φ χ θ
σ κφ φ χσ θ
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
−⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Combining the first order conditions leads to an expression for the bargained wage as 
the sum of the reservation utility and a share φ  of a surplus term:  
                                                 
11 This is the standard efficient bargaining framework, which guarantees that total surplus 
(worker’s surplus of employment over unemployment plus firm’s profits) is maximized. 
See Layard (1991) for an overview of wage bargaining setups.  
12 A note on the timing is in order here. Since employment hC is determined by the vacancies 
posted in the previous period, any bargaining over employment must be over future em-
ployment, which is controllable by the vacancies currently posted. The key assumption is 
that here – in contrast to the individual bargaining setup – union labor contracts are binding 
for the next period. In addition, if negotiations break down, the presence of a binding con-
tract for the current period (negotiated in the previous period) implies that workers will 
only be able to impose their threat of shutting down the firm in the next period. These sub-
tleties of timing do not play any role in the steady-state case, but must be taken into account 
when extending this setup to account for shocks. 
13 The microfoundation for static Nash bargaining is a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky alter-
nating offer game. The bargaining power of the parties represent their relative degrees of  
patience. The standard choice of φ  = 0.50 implies that firm owners and workers have iden-
tical discount factors.  
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Note that the surplus component of the wage curve is closely related to firm profits, 
and is increasing in monopoly power 1σ . In the perfect competition limit, as ∞→σ , 
the surplus approaches zero and the worker receives only his reservation utility. Firm-
level employment is given implicitly by: 
( )
( )
1
1
C
U
p y rA V
P r q
σ κχσ θ
− = ++            (11) 
 
2. Individual Bargaining 
Under individual bargaining, each worker bargains separately over wages with the 
firm. If negotiations break down, the worker can walk away into unemployment im-
mediately, depriving the firm of his marginal revenue product and forcing the firm to 
hire a new worker (to obtain the profit-maximizing employment level). Hence, under 
individual bargaining, the firm’s surplus is the worker’s marginal contribution to the 
firm’s value 
Ih
V
∂
∂ . The individual Nash bargaining problem becomes: 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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The worker’s surplus is obtained from equation (4), while the firm’s surplus term can 
be obtained from the envelope condition of the firm’s problem (6). The first order 
condition of the individual bargaining problem yields a first-order linear differential 
equation: 
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with solution14 
( ) ( ) ( )11
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σφ φ σ φ
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Next, we need to obtain an expression for labor demand and a closed form for the 
bargained wage. We use (12) to substitute out for the II
I
wh
h
∂
∂  term in (8) and apply the 
steady-state to obtain a closed form for the firm's Euler equation:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 I
I I
p y
w h A r
P q
σ κχσ φ θ
−= − +−               (13) 
The firm’s labor demand equation does not satisfy the usual condition that employ-
ment costs (made up of wages and hiring costs, ( ) ( )Iw r q
κχ θ+ + ) equal marginal 
revenue product (given by ( )
P
ypA Iσ
σ 1− ). Rather, firms hire workers beyond the 
point at which MRP equals hiring costs. The reason is that the downward-sloping 
wage curve implies that by hiring an additional worker, firms are able to depress the 
wages of all workers (recalling that all workers are treated as the marginal worker). 
This results in a hiring externality, and hence an incentive to expand hiring beyond 
the efficient level15. This externality – and the overhiring – are stronger when monop-
oly power is greater, due to the greater steepness of the wage curve (which in turn de-
rives from the greater steepness of the MRP schedule). Hence, under individual bar-
gaining, there is a countervailing effect to the first-principles restriction of output and 
employment under monopoly power. We shall see in the quantitative section that this 
                                                 
14 The solution is derived in the appendix. 
15 Hiring externalities under individual bargaining were first described in partial equilibrium 
by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).  
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will contribute to output and employment being far less sensitive to monopoly power 
under individual bargaining than under collective bargaining. 
Firm-level employment and bargained wages are found at the intersection of 
the wage curve (12) and of the labor demand schedule (13). This yields an expression 
for the bargained wage:  
( ) ( )1 1I U
rw V r
r q
φ κχφ θ= + ++ −    (14) 
Once again, the bargained wage can be expressed as the sum of the reservation 
utility and a share of the surplus. Under individual bargaining, however, the surplus 
share is not related to profits, but rather to hiring costs. The intuition is that under in-
dividual bargaining, the worker’s value to the firm is his marginal value. At the opti-
mum of the firm’s problem, this marginal value is equated to the cost to hiring that 
worker. Put another way, the main cost that an individually bargaining worker can 
impose on a firm when negotiations break down is the cost to rehiring him. 
 
3. Choice of bargaining regime 
We consider two labor law regimes. First, one regime restricts the ability of workers 
to form collective bargaining coalitions, effectively mandating the use of individual 
bargaining. Under the second, more liberal regime, workers may freely choose 
whether to form a collective bargaining coalition or not. When choosing a bargaining 
regime, workers compare not total wages but bargaining surpluses, as their reserva-
tion wage will be unaffected by the choice of bargaining regime at their own firm.16  
Under each bargaining regime, the steady-state surplus may be found as: 
                                                 
16 The reason is that the firm is assumed to be small enough with respect to the aggregate so 
that its choice of bargaining regime has negligible impact on employment prospects at 
other firms, unemployment benefits and the value to home production. 
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Hence, workers prefer collective bargaining, and will form unions when allowed if the 
collective bargaining surplus exceeds its individual bargaining counterpart. This is the 
case whenever:  
( ) ( ) ( )11 IC qAp y r
θσ φ χ κ< − +    (16) 
The intuition is that collective bargaining surpluses are profit shares, which are in-
creasing in monopoly power. This makes forming a collective bargaining coalition 
more attractive when monopoly power is greater, i.e. when demand elasticity σ  is 
smaller. In the quantitative analysis of section V, we will show that workers prefer 
collective bargaining, even when the degree of monopoly power is moderate.  
 
4. Preempting Unions 
We now ask whether firms, aware that workers were gaining the legal ability to form 
collective bargaining coalitions, could offer wage-employment pairs to preempt such 
union formation. That is, we ask formally, do preemptive wage-employment pairs 
(wP,hP) exist such that both firms and workers are at least as well off as under collec-
tive bargaining? In Proposition 1, we establish that there exist no such pairs.17 As a 
result, the only way to prevent workers from organizing is to offer the workers the 
collective bargaining wage-employment pair (wC,hC). We conclude that if firms be-
lieved that union organization was iminent, they would be fully rational in opting to 
offer (wC,hC) to their non-unionized workers, perhaps in order to avoid some non-
pecuniary cost or disruption due to union organization.  
                                                 
17 Proposition 1 is simply an expression of the fact that collective bargaining is efficient, in 
the sense that it maximizes joint surplus of workers and firms.  
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Proposition 1: There exists no wage-employment pair (wP,hP) such that both firms 
and workers are at least as well off as under collective bargaining, that is, such that  
( ) ( )
, ,
, ,P P C C
E P U P E C U C
w h w h
V V h V V h
π π≥
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ≥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
where ( ),w hπ  are the firm’s profits under wage-employment pair ( ),w h . 
Proof: See Appendix A.2 
 
F. Reservation Value of Unemployment 
Next, we need to find a closed form solution for the reservation value of unemploy-
ment. This reservation value will differ, depending on whether the economy is in its 
individual or collective bargaining regime. The reason is that the reservation value of 
unemployment is composed of two terms: the flow value to unemployment b plus a 
term which captures the probability of obtaining a new job and the surplus obtained 
when employed. The second term obviously differs according to the bargaining re-
gime.  
Using (2) and (3) to obtain an expression for VU,I as a function of b and wI, and 
then combining with the individual bargaining wage (14) yields a closed form expres-
sion for VU,I: 
,1 1U I I
r V b
r
φ κθφ= ++ −                (17) 
Similarly, one can obtain the reservation value for unemployment under collective 
bargaining by combining (2), (3), (10) and (11) to obtain: 
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ),
1
1 1 1U C CC C
rr V b
r r f r f
χ σ φχ κθχ σ φ θ χ σ φ θ
+ −= ++ + − − + − −           (18)  
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G. Equilibrium 
To close the model, a market clearing constraint for goods is needed, which guaran-
tees that aggregate demand equals supply.  
( )k
k
p y
Y y
P
=  
When all firms engage in collective bargaining, the market clearing condition reduces 
to: 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 C C
r
A b
r f q
χ σ κ χχ σ φ θ θ
⎡ ⎤+= +⎢ ⎥+ − − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
           (19) 
When all firms engage in individual bargaining, the equilibrium condition becomes: 
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1I I
A b r
q
σ φ φ κκθ χσ φ φ θ
⎡ ⎤−= + + +⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                     (20) 
In both cases, the equilibrium conditions pin down the equilibrium value of labor 
market tightness kθ  as a function of parameters, including the degree of demand 
elasticity (a measure of monopoly power) σ . This closes the model. From the 
Beveridge curve, equilibrium unemployment ( )ku θ is a decreasing function of tight-
ness kθ . Since labor is supplied inelastically, and the population is normalized to one, 
equilibrium employment is simply ( )kk uh θ−=1 , and equilibrium output is given by 
kk Ahy = . 
 
G. Qualitative Results 
In section IV below, we will present quantitative results based on the model presented 
in this section. At this point, we summarize several important qualitative conclusions 
that emerge. First, when monopoly power is sufficiently high, workers have strong 
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incentives to try to form collective bargaining coalitions. Hence, if restrictions on un-
ion organization fall, the model predicts that union activity will increase.  
Second, firms’ profits must be lower under collective bargaining for two rea-
sons: first, collectively bargaining firms must give up a profit share to workers, while 
individually bargaining firms do not. In addition, individually bargaining firms have 
an additional degree of freedom to maximize profits, due to their ability to manipulate 
wages via overhiring. A switch from individual bargaining to collective bargaining 
causes firms’ profits and stock market valuations to fall.  
Third, the model predicts that a switch from individual to collective bargaining 
leads to output to be more tightly restricted by firms, provided monopoly power is 
sufficiently high. The reason is that when monopoly power is high enough, then (19) 
and (20) guarantee that θC < θI , so that u(θC) > u(θI), and hence yC < yI. In addition, 
the gap between yC and yI is increasing in the degree of monopoly power. Hence, we 
can conclude that the negative impact of an increase in monopoly power on employ-
ment and output is greater under collective bargaining than under individual bargain-
ing18. 
These three conclusions form an intriguing picture. Collective bargaining 
shifts a share of profits from firms to workers. If monopoly power is strong and prof-
its are high, workers have strong incentives to organize and bargain collectively, 
while firms have equally strong incentives to restrict workers’ ability to organize, so 
that monopoly power can be seen as sowing the seeds of labor conflict. 
In addition, for a given level of monopoly power, output and employment will 
be greater under individual bargaining, as will profits. Hence, when restrictions on 
                                                 
18 In a quantitative model, Ebell and Haefke (2005) show that the impact of monopoly power 
on employment and output under individual bargaining is very close to zero, due to the 
counteracting first principles and overhiring effects. 
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union formation are lifted, the subsequent switch from individual to collective bar-
gaining leads to a drop in output, employment and firm values, and presents as a re-
cession. The stronger is monopoly power, the greater the gap between the two re-
gimes, and hence the sharper the induced slump. Conversely, a virtual prohibition of 
collective bargaining would lead to increases in output, employment and firm values, 
and would present as the sort of economic upturn experienced during the US during 
the roaring 20’s. 
 
III. Labor market and antitrust policies in the 1920s 
The Sherman Act of 1890 threatened “contracts, combinations (…) or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade” with severe sanctions, and treated workers’ unions and producers’ 
cartels or trusts in symmetric fashion19. However, both public and case law evolved 
significantly over time, at times undercutting, at times reinforcing the Sherman Act. 
We believe that between the immediate pre-World War I years and the New Deal, two 
distinct regime changes in the legal stance toward trade unions can be identified that 
greatly affected the wage bargaining setup. In contrast, antitrust enforcement under-
went a more gradual change, and no clear structural break between World War I and 
the New Deal emerges. In the present section, we will briefly discuss the main issues 
and carve out the stylized facts, however without aiming to give a comprehensive 
overview, which would far exceed the scope of this paper. With the stylized facts in 
hand, the next section will trace the implications for a calibrated version of the model 
presented in Section II above. 
                                                 
19 July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. 
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A. Labor  
Armed with the provisions of the Sherman Act, courts prior to World War I curbed 
strikes frequently through the use of injunctions. As a consequence, the overall degree 
of unionization remained low. Around 1910, union membership exceeded 10 % of the 
non-agricultural labor force only in mining, transport, and construction, where indus-
try characteristics and skill requirements facilitated unionization20. This changed after 
the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 exempted organized labor from the Sherman Act’s 
presumption of conspiracy in restraint of trade.21 With a delay of one year, trade union 
membership began to soar. Mitigated by wartime efforts to appease organized labor 
and avoid disruptions in production and transport22, an upsurge in labor disputes fol-
lowed (Table 1). 
Table 1: Indicators of U.S. Trade Union Activity, 1916 to 1920 
 
Between 1916 and 1920, union membership as a percentage of the labor force grew 
from less than 10 % to over 16 % . Total strike duration dipped briefly in 1917 and 
1918 and then soared, as did the number of involved workers. In Table 1 we also pro-
                                                 
20 See Friedman (1999). 
21 October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730. 
22 These include the adoption of the eight-hour day in railroads in 1916 (Adamson Act) and, 
beginning in 1917, state control over the railroads, which ended only in 1920. 
1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Trade union
density (percent of labor force) (1) 9.9 10.9 12.6 14.3 16.7
Number of workers
involved in strikes (1000) (2) 1599 1227 1240 4160 1463
Average duration (days) (3) 23 19 17 34 39
Total days lost (4) 29201 14396 16735 98452 33848
Sources and Methods: (1) Wolman (1936), Bain and Price (1980)
(2) Peterson (1938)
(3) BLS Monthly Labor Review , July 1929
(4) Own calculations from the sources in (3), using 1928 proportions.
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vide a tentative estimate of the total number of workdays lost to strikes, which con-
firms the picture of substantial trade union activity a the end of World War I.23 
Up until 1918, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the Clayton Act from 
those of World War I. By 1919, however, one can assume that many wartime effects 
had ceased, so that the impact of increased union activity would be felt. At this point, 
the picture becomes clearer: Beginning in 1919, trade union activity increased 
sharply. Organized labor struck in Seattle in 1919, beginning with a shipyard strike 
that extended into a general strike. The Boston police went on strike, only to be dis-
charged wholesale and replaced by new policemen. More important was the attempted 
reorganization of labor in U.S. coal and steel industry and a prolonged steel workers’ 
strike in 1919 and 1920, which at one time involved over 300 thousand workers and 
shut down a considerable percentage of America’s steel making capacity. A major 
coal strike in late 1919 was put down by an injunction obtained by the Federal Gov-
ernment, citing wartime legislation on the coal industry. The steel workers’ strike 
ended without concessions from the employers, while the coal miners obtained a pay 
increase of 27 % in an arbitration process that followed the end of the strike.24 Still, 
unions had flexed their muscles and demonstrated that given the limitation of injunc-
tions under the Clayton Act, they could cause major disruption to economic activity. 
Summing up, we see the years following the passage of the Clayton Act as the first 
                                                 
23 Sources for the period between 1905 and 1916 seem to be shaky. They also do not provide 
data on the total number of days lost to strikes until 1926, when the methodology was 
changed, see Edwards (1981). For 1927 and 1928, the available sources report the number 
of lost days and the older estimate of total strike days alongside each other. We used the ra-
tio between the two series in 1928 to backward extrapolate total workdays lost, employing 
the data on workers involved and total strike days in Table 1. This amounts to assuming 
that the proportion between the number of workers involved and the number of strike days 
in all years is as in 1928. 
24 See, e.g., Dulles and Dubovsky (1984).  
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labor market regime, characterized by an increasing role for trade unions and collec-
tive bargaining. 
However, the regime created by the Clayton Act was brought to end in 1921, 
and a severe backlash against unions ensued. In early 1921, the Supreme Court ruled 
on a case in which striking workers had attempted to organize the boycott of a firm by 
its suppliers and customers. The court determined that this interfered with interstate 
commerce and violated the Sherman Act, arguing that nothing in the Clayton Act pro-
tected unions from injunctions which might be brought against them for conspiracy in 
restraint of trade25. This early ruling, however, did not touch on the Clayton Act’s 
protections for the right of unions to organize picket lines, so that union activity re-
mained high during 1921. Going further, in a case of picketing that was argued in Oc-
tober and decided in December of the 1921, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clayton 
Act introduced no new principles and was merely declaratory of existing practice26. 
This ruling had the crushing effect of reducing union activity to mere information and 
persuasion, and even this not anywhere near factory gates. The ruling explicitly de-
termined that picketing was unlawful and subject to injunction, just as in the days be-
                                                 
25  Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering , 254 U.S. 443 (Jan. 3, 1921). The decisive passage 
referring to Section VI of the Clayton Act says: “But there is nothing in the section to ex-
empt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from 
its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken as authorizing 
any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a 
cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the anti-
trust laws.” [254 U.S. 443, 469]. 
26 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (December 5, 
1921) The passage reads: “It is clear that Congress wished to forbid the use by the federal 
courts of their equity arm to prevent peaceable persuasion by employees, discharged or ex-
pectant, in promotion of their side of the dispute, and to secure them against judicial re-
straint in obtaining or communicating information in any place where they might lawfully 
be. This introduces no new principle into the equity jurisprudence of those courts. It is 
merely declaratory of what was the best practice always. Congress thought it wise to stabi-
lize this rule of action and render it uniform.” [257 U.S. 184, 203].  
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fore the Clayton Act.27 In a decision handed down a few days later, the Supreme 
Court declared an Arizona state law unconstitutional that had allowed peaceful picket-
ing, arguing that picketing involved considerable losses of business and therefore vio-
lated a property right under the 14th Amendment.28  
As a result of these landmark decisions, the use of injunctions resumed imme-
diately and recovered to pre-1914 levels, see Brissenden (1933), rendering the provi-
sions of the Clayton Act almost immaterial. Consequently, trade unions were severely 
weakened for most of the decade, and union membership declined by one third (see 
Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Indicators of U.S. Trade Union Activity, 1921 to 1928 
 
As Table 2 shows, trade union activity declined markedly during the 1920s by all in-
dicators, and become an almost marginal phenomenon toward the end of the decade. 
In 1928, trade union density, the number of workers involved in labor disputes, and 
                                                 
27 [257 U.S. 184, 205]. 
28 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (December 19, 1921).  
1921 1924 1926 1928
Trade union
density (percent of labor force) (1) 15.5 10.7 10.2 9.6
Number of workers
involved in strikes (1000) (2) 1099 655 330 314
Average duration (days) (3) 51 30 25 27
Total days lost (4) 39521 20930 7767 12600
Sources and Methods: (1) Wolman (1936), Bain and Price (1980)
(2) Peterson (1938)
(3) BLS Monthly Labor Review , July 1929
(4) Own calculations from the sources in (3), using 1928 proportions.
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the loss of days due to strikes all were far lower than at the beginning of the decade, 
and indeed lower than before World War I. In line with conventional wisdom on 
interwar labor history, we see this return to the low pre-war levels of trade union ac-
tivity as a major regime change in the U.S. labor market constitution. The Supreme 
Court decisions of 1921 repealed the pertinent clauses of the Clayton Act, reversed 
the growth of trade unionism and marginalized collective wage bargaining in large 
swaths of the U.S. economy for almost a decade.  
 However, this reversal to individual bargaining was not to last. In what ini-
tially seemed like an isolated development, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 contained 
pro-union legislation, which made collective bargaining at a company level manda-
tory and provided for state arbitration. Railroad companies soon attempted to circum-
vent the provisions of the Railroad Labor Act by setting up their own company unions 
and staffing them with representatives of their liking. 
Such was the case with the Texas and New Orleans Railroad. A trade union 
active in this firm, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, had taken a 
wage dispute to the U.S. Board of Mediation. As a reaction, the management shut out 
the union and replaced it with one of its own design. This case was taken to court in 
1927, and won by the trade union against the appeals of the railway company, most 
importantly in the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in 1929. When the case was brought 
to the Supreme Court in 1930, it famously upheld the rulings of the District Court and 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, citing as a well-established rule the principle that the 
Supreme Court would not overturn a lower court ruling if the two previous courts had 
agreed, unless clear error was shown [281 U.S. 548, 558; May 26, 1930].  
This case marked a major sea change in American industrial relations, as it 
overturned a whole string of previous Supreme Court rulings that had upheld employ-
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ers’ rights against trade unions29. Indeed, the new precedent was set, not just with the 
1930 Supreme Court decision itself but already with the 1929 decision by the 2nd Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Overturning this ruling would have implied a major break with 
legal traditions, a step that the Supreme Court was unwilling to take.  
The effects of this turnaround in the attitude of the courts towards trade unions 
cannot possibly be overestimated. Numerous previous attempts by state and federal 
legislators to regulate labor markets had been thwarted by court rulings that upheld 
the First and Fourth Amendment and repeatedly ruled the pertinent legislation uncon-
stitutional, or minimized its legal enforceability (see Brissenden, 1933). With the 
Texas and New Orleans v. Brotherhood case, trade union power and collective 
bargaining in the railroad industry were now firmly established. In addition, a 
precedent was set for further court rulings on industrial labor relations, and the road 
for more union-friendly legislation was free. In particular, this is true of the so-called 
Shipstead anti-injunction bill, a proposal for legislation that had been introduced first 
in 1929, was reintroduced in 1931 as the Shipstead-Norris bill, eventually passed and 
enacted as the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. This bill reinstated limitations against 
the use of injunctions in labor disputes as originally intended in the Clayton Act, but 
had initially been shelved for fear of being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, the Shipstead bill’s first incarnation, introduced to Congress in January 
1929, was quickly tabled by the Senate Judiciary Committee because it was 
considered certain to be ruled unconstitutional. In August 1929, however, shortly after 
the Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld the District Court’s original decision in the 
Texas & N.O. case, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, composed of 
                                                 
29 Indeed, the railroad company had argued that the respective passages of the Railroad Act 
either conferred only an abstract, non-enforceable right or were altogether unconstitutional, 
citing arguments similar to those that the Supreme Court had used in Tri-City v. Deering in 
1921 against the limitation of injunctions in the Clayton Act. 
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N.O. case, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, composed of Senators 
Walsh, Norris and Blaine, presented a new piece of anti-injunction legislation for ap-
proval by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor (AFL).30 This 
new anti-injunction legislation was approved by the delegates to the AFL’s annual 
convention on October 18, 1929, clearing the way for its introduction to Congress. 
This new push for anti-injunction legislation was widely reported in the press during 
the week of October 14-19th, the week before Black Thursday, and on October 27th. 31 
A version of this bill ultimately passed as the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Hence, by Octo-
ber 1929, it should have been clear to investors and firms that labor unions were likely 
to re-obtain the rights to strike and picket in the near future.  
Summing up, there is evidence from prominent court rulings in the late 1920s 
of a major sea change in the attitude toward union formation and collective bargaining 
which foreshadowed the New Deal and rendered it legally feasible altogether. Indeed, 
recent research has gone so far as to argue for major continuity between Republican 
policy toward trade unions on the eve of the Great Depression and the New Deal, see 
O'Brien (1998). Given these legislative efforts and court rulings, rational investors at 
the end of the 1920s had good reason to believe that a regime shift back to greater un-
ion activity was underway, and that a persistent downward shift in profits, output, and 
employment would follow. We see this regime change as a decisive event forming 
expectations about future profits on the eve of the Great Depression. By implication 
                                                 
30 August 24, 1929 edition of the New York Times, headlined “Labor Men Revise Injunction 
Bill: Federation Council Believes It Now Has A Measure That Congress will Accept”. 
31 Articles appeared in the October 14th, October 15th, October 18th, October 19th and October 
27th editions of the New York Times. On October 27th, the New York Times headlined a 
prominent article in its Sunday supplement (the precursor to today’s Week in Review sec-
tion): “LABOR’S MAGNA CHARTA DRAFTED FOR CONGRESS: Anti-Injunction Bill 
of the A.F. of L. Is Designed to Assure Workers the Right to Strike and Picket, and the 
Same Liberty as Farmers to Combine.” 
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and in line with recent historiography, pro-union legislation and the institutionaliza-
tion of collective wage bargaining under the New Deal emerge as the new labor mar-
ket regime whose parameters were defined beginning already in 1929, not just in 
1933. 
 
B. Antitrust 
While regulation of the labor market was subject to violent swings in legal opinion, 
competition policy for product markets was not. Indeed, the regulatory environment 
of the 1920s was one of laxity in antitrust enforcement, and highly conducive to ab-
normally high corporate profits. The antitrust and merger policies of the Coolidge 
administration consisted in pre-approving mergers, although the Sherman and Clayton 
acts did not provide for such a measure. Profit shares, measured by the share of capi-
tal in sectoral and national income, appear to have increased substantially throughout 
the decade, to the effect that profits outpaced the growth of wages (on the latter, see 
Lebergott (1964)).  
Although parts of this phenomenon can be explained by rapid growth of capi-
tal-intensive sectors, much of it is evidently due to increased monopoly profits. This is 
partly due to the fact that two of the three rapid-growing sectors in question, public 
utilities and railways, were heavily regulated during the 1920s, and that regulators al-
lowed maximum profits in these industries to increase over time. Keller (1973) col-
lects the evidence, reviews the earlier literature and notes, inter alia, a 33% hike in 
railroad freight rates imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1922, 
which was not reversed when input cost for railroads fell sharply later in the decade. 
Similar evidence is documented for utilities. In the metal-making and metal process-
ing industry (including electrical), which Keller (1973) identifies as the third fast-
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growing sector of the U.S. economy of the 1920s, concentration ratios were high at 
the beginning of the decade and rose further: in steel making. The eight largest steel 
producers increased their market share from 58 percent in 1920 to 78 percent in 1930. 
Likewise, the three largest auto producers had a market share of 68 percent in 1920, 
and of 72 percent in 1930. Evidently, monopoly power in U.S. product markets was 
high and kept increasing markedly throughout the 1920s.  
 Just what the markups over cost were seems difficult to ascertain. Hanes 
(1996) tackles this issue indirectly by looking into the cyclical behavior of wages in 
manufacturing. Under monopolistic competition, markups would react procyclically, 
causing wages to be countercyclical. For carefully constructed, intertemporally com-
parable wage and price series, Hanes’ (1996) finding is that wages were more coun-
tercyclical in the interwar period than during the postwar. By implication, markups 
over cost must have been higher and the degree of competition lower between the 
wars than in the postwar period. Then, postwar markups over cost would constitute a 
lower bound for those of the interwar period.  
While estimating markups from industry data is difficult and results differ 
widely, the available evidence suggests that markups in US. manufacturing were con-
siderable in the postwar period. Hall (1988) arrives at estimated markups in excess of 
80%, while a more conservative estimate by Roeger (1995) puts markups at a still 
high 45-48%. Combining these findings with the results of Hanes (1996) on the cycli-
cal behavior of wages, markups in the interwar period must have been in the range of 
50% over cost or higher. 
Thus, we identify a regime of high and increasing monopoly power in the 
American economy during the 1920s. This leads to the obvious question of why anti-
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trust enforcement was so low and what the possible connections with the trade union 
questions were. 
 
C. Welfare Capitalism 
In the increasingly union-free environment of the 1920s, leading firms renewed at-
tempts to establish a system of industrial relations based on voluntary benefits and 
above-market wages. These schemes, commonly labeled as “welfare capitalism” and 
seen as a paternalistic substitute for public labor market intervention, did not start in 
the 1920s, nor did they end with the depression.32 However, they were most prevalent 
during the 1920s, and arguably concentrated in industries with substantial monopoly 
power. 
Welfare capitalism received much political attention and implicit government 
support under the Coolidge administration, with Herbert Hoover, then commerce sec-
retary, playing a most active role in the process. Inspired by the experience of wartime 
planning and informed by pre-Keynesian under-consumptionist doctrines of workers’ 
purchasing power, Hoover’s policies as commerce secretary sought to boost wages33, 
while tolerating, if not actively supporting, collusive practices in business. Prominent 
among his measures was the promotion of data sharing and standardization by indus-
try associations, a measure that came close to an explicit violation of the ban on collu-
sive behavior in the Clayton Act and was harshly criticized, both within the admini-
stration and in public.34 Hoover and others strongly advocated at the time that welfare 
capitalism was self-financing or even profitable. Indeed, research by Raff and Sum-
                                                 
32 See Cohen (1990), Jacoby (1997). 
33 See e.g. Barber (1985). 
34 On this see above all, Hawley (1974), Himmelberg (1976). 
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mers (1987) on the five dollar day at Ford has demonstrated that raising wages above 
market levels could generate substantial profits.  
While their celebrated interpretation of the evidence was in terms of efficiency 
wage theory, a second element is that above-average wages were highly effective in 
keeping unions out of the factory. Recent research has cast doubt on the long-term 
viability of such schemes for less prominent firms, as these programs quickly lost sig-
nificance during the depression and the New Deal35. This suggests that firms indeed 
often maintained company benefits to keep trade unions out, and lost interest as soon 
as trade union representation became more widespread.  
Indeed, a political link existed between trade union and antitrust policy. 
Against the stiff resistance of the Justice Department that sought stricter antitrust en-
forcement, Hoover as commerce secretary had gradually extended collective bargain-
ing and trade union representation, most notably in the 1926 Railway Act of 1926 dis-
cussed above. After his election in 1928, and again around the stock market crash of 
October 1929, Hoover employed carrot-and-stick policies to induce industry to main-
tain high wages and adopt a union-friendly attitude in spite of the impending reces-
sion, using tighter antitrust enforcement as a threat. The apparent hope was that by 
maintaining the purchasing power of labor, the level of private consumption could be 
stabilized36. Indeed, major business leaders followed suit, and Ford pledged to in-
crease its daily wage from six to seven dollars (Barber, 1985). 
Bittlingmayer (1992) has argued Hoover’s threat of tighter antitrust policy in 
October 1929 may have contributed to the stock market crash. We do not rule this out. 
However, as will become clear in the following section, the macroeconomic conse-
                                                 
35 See e.g. Gordon (1994), Jacoby (1997). 
36 This policy experiment failed, and private consumption declined precipitously beginning in 
1930, as evidenced by the data in Romer (1990). 
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quences of a change to stricter antitrust with individual bargaining would have been 
radically different from the ones we see in the data. Bittlingmayer (1992) himself 
concedes that there is little evidence of any subsequent action on tougher anti-trust 
policy during the Hoover administration, so that the high degrees of monopoly power 
persisted through the Great Depression, and further throughout the 1930s.  
Tighter antitrust was used as a threat, but not meant as a commitment. Herbert 
Hoover’s strategic pledge, supported by the turnaround in Supreme Court opinion, 
was to keep wages high, promote collective wage bargaining, and turn a blind eye to 
collusive practices and monopolization in industry. In this, he differed not one iota 
from the policy of his successor in office after 1932, Franklin Roosevelt37. 
 
IV. Labor power and equilibrium regime shifts 
In this section we place the historical evidence presented in Section III in the context 
of the model of monopolistic competition and labor market frictions presented in Sec-
tion II, thus putting the pieces of the puzzle together. To this end, we present a nu-
merical example using parameter values which are standard in the search friction lit-
erature. We choose the degree of monopoly power in the economy at the times of the 
shifts in steady states in 1921 and in 1929 to match the asset price movements in the 
data. We then ask whether the shifts in macro variables in the model induced by these 
demand elasticities match the macro movements in the data. . We find that shifts in 
the bargaining regime from individual to collective bargaining lead to severe reces-
sions of the same magnitude as those observed in 1920-21 and beginning in 1929.  
                                                 
37 On the consensus among historians about this, see Himmelberg (1976), O'Brien (1998). 
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A. Parameter Values 
The parameter values used are summarized in Table 3. The period length is one quar-
ter. There are eight parameters to choose: the technology parameter A, the discount 
factor β, workers’ bargaining power φ , the matching elasticity η, the flow value of 
unemployment b, the exogenous job destruction rate χ, the matching scale parameter s 
and vacancy costs κ.  
 
Parameter Description Value Comment 
    
A Technology level 1.0 Normalization 
Β Discount factor 0.99 4.0 % annual interest rate 
Φ Bargaining power 0.50 Standard 
η Matching elasticity 0.50 Data 
B Flow value of unemploymt 0.30 post-war b between 0.40 and 0.60. 
χ Separation rate 0.10 Data 
s Scaling factor 0.46 Normalization 
Κ Vacancy posting cost 0.19 natural rate of unemployment 5.0 % 
    
 
Table 3: Interwar parameterization 
 
Without loss of generality, A is set to unity, and there are no shocks to productivity.38 
The quarterly discount factor is chosen to generate a riskless interest rate of r = 4.0 % 
annually, leading to a choice of β = 0.99. The matching elasticity η  is set to 0.50, as 
is standard in the literature on search frictions and wage bargaining, and in the range 
of estimates [ ]0.4,0.7  reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Also standard is 
the imposition of the Hosios condition that matching elasticity and workers’ bargain-
                                                 
38 This implies that our results do not depend on real business cycle type shocks to total factor 
productivity. 
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ing power are equal,η φ= .39 The flow value of unemployment b is set to 0.30, 
equivalent to 30% of full employment output. This low replacement rate reflects the 
lack of unemployment insurance in the interwar period, so that the flow value of un-
employment would have derived exclusively from home production (primarily in ag-
riculture, which still had a labor share of around 20% at the time) and charitable assis-
tance. By comparison, analyses of the late 20th-century US labor market typically as-
sume that b takes values in the range of 0.40 to 0.60. The exogenous rate of job de-
struction is set at 0.118χ = , so that 11.8 % of jobs are destroyed each quarter, corre-
sponding to the average total separation rate between 1922 and 1930 reported in the 
Monthly Labor Review of July 1929 and February 1931.40 The matching scale pa-
rameter s is chosen to replicate a firm’s matching rate of 0.25. As emphasized by 
Shimer (2005), the choices of s and q are merely a normalization, and hence innocu-
ous.  Finally, vacancy costs κ are chosen so that unemployment is 5.0 % under indi-
vidual bargaining in the perfect competition limit. This corresponds to a natural rate 
of unemployment in a laissez-faire economy. The resulting vacancy costs of κ = 0.18, 
in conjunction with the firm’s matching rate q(θ) = 0.25, yield a cost of about 0.72 
units of output per hire. This corresponds to about 20% of a worker’s annual wage, in 
line with the estimates reported in Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). 
 This parameterization allows us to characterize equilibrium at each degree of 
competition in the goods markets. Figure 1 shows the behavior of output, unemploy-
ment, asset values and wages as a function of monopoly power (measured as the de-
                                                 
39 In the collective bargaining economy, the Hosios condition is necessary and sufficient for 
allocative efficiency. In the individual bargaining economy, the Hosios condition is neces-
sary but not sufficient for efficiency. For a detailed welfare analysis, see Ebell and Haefke 
(2005).  
40 By comparison, the post-war job destruction rate estimated by Shimer (2005) is 10.0% 
quarterly. 
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mand elasticity σ  facing firms). Clearly, when demand elasticity is lower than 14.0, 
or equivalently when individual bargaining markups exceed 3.8 %, a switch from in-
dividual to collective bargaining induces a recession involving a decrease in output, 
an increase in unemployment, an increase in wages and a drop in asset values. The 
magnitude of the respective macro and asset price movements are increasing in the 
degree of monopoly power. In the next subsection, we describe how we pin down the 
demand elasticities at crucial junctures using data on asset price movements. This al-
lows us to examine the impact of changes in the bargaining regime without having to 
restrict the behavior of macro variables a priori.  
 
 
Figure 1: Unemployment, output, wages, and asset values as a function of demand elasticity  
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B. Interwar asset prices 
First, we describe the behavior of asset prices in the interwar period. We will then go 
on to use asset price data to pin down the degree of monopoly power in our model, as 
quantified by the elasticity of demand facing firms. Since we are interested in low-
frequency changes in steady-states, we base our choice of σ  on HP-trend values for 
asset prices, rather than the raw values.  
The period between the  Clayton Act’s enactment in October of 1914 and the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929-32 was one of unparalleled volatility in asset prices. Figure 2a 
presents the Standard and Poor’s 500 and Figure 2b presents the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average41, both deflated using the Consumer Price Index and rebased to 7/1914 = 
100. The smooth red lines in Figures 2a and 2b show the Hodrick-Prescott trend with 
a smoothing factor of 129,600, as suggested for monthly data by Ravn and Uhlig 
(2004). Defining a stock market crash as a decline of at least 20% within a 12 month 
window, Mishkin and White (2002) identify crashes in 1914, 1915, 1917, 1920 and 
1921. Although there was an intermittent wartime upswing, the trend between late 
1914 and 1921 is clearly downward.42 Between December43 of 1914 and August of 
1921, the S&P 500 lost half of its value, while the Dow lost nearly 30% of its value 
over the same period.  
                                                 
41 The differing behavior of the Standard and Poor’s stock price index due to its broader base, 
covering 50 industrials, 20 railroad stocks and 20 public utilities. In contrast, at the begin-
ning of the period considered, the Dow Jones Industrials contained only twelve firms, ex-
panding to 20 in October 1916 and to 30 in October 1928, and included neither railroads 
nor public utilities. 
42 As previously noted, it is probable that World War I played a role in asset price movements 
as well. However, it is not at all clear why WWI should have led to a drop in asset prices. 
In contrast, asset prices increased over the course of WWII. 
43 The Clayton Act was enacted in October of 1914. Stock markets, however, were closed be-
tween July 31 and December 14, 1914. Due to the beginning of World War I in July 1914, 
it is very difficult to isolate the direct impact of the Clayton Act. 
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Real Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1913-1939
(1914:07 = 100)
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Figure 2a and b: Real Dow Jones and Standard & Poor’s stock market indices, 1913-1939. 
  
Turning to the model, Figure 3 below shows the ratio between firm values under col-
lective and individual bargaining 
I
C
V
V , when each regime is assumed to be permanent 
by investors. A demand elasticity of 4.0 (corresponding to an individual bargaining 
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markup of 20 %44) would lead to a drop in firm values of 28%, while a demand elas-
ticity of 2.6 (corresponding to an individual bargaining markup of 31.%) would lead 
to a drop in firm values of 47%. We believe that these are conservative estimate of 
markups in the interwar period. By comparison, Hall (1988) estimates markups for 
manufacturing industries using post-war U.S. data, and finds values in excess of 86 
%. Using an alternative methodology, Roeger (1995) estimates U.S. postwar markups 
for durable goods to be 45%, while finding the corresponding value for nondurable 
goods to be 48%.  This suggests the markups required to rationalize the asset price 
drop in the wake of the Clayton Act are quite reasonable and are indeed at the lower 
bound of the plausible historical values. 
 Turning to the upsurge in asset prices beginning in the 4th quarter of 1921, we 
note that the recovery of stock market valuations in the wake of the Tri-City v. Deer-
ing and Truax v. Corrigan decisions was very steep. Within 8 months, by April 1922, 
the Dow had regained its July 1914 value. Similarly, the S&P 500 had recorded a gain 
of nearly 50% from its August 1921 trough by August 1922. Both indices then re-
mained relatively steady until the 3rd Quarter of 1924, when they began to rise once 
again, culminating in the peak of September 1929. The HP-trend of the S&P index 
rose to more than double their trough values, exceeding their pre-war peaks.  
  We identify two factors that played a role in this unprecedented boom in asset 
markets, the change in the bargaining environment and an increase in monopoly 
power. We attribute the first phase of the increase in stock market values to the Su-
preme Court’s 1921 rulings, which severely restricted union activity. Second, increas-
ing monopoly power due to lax anti-trust enforcement of the Coolidge administration 
                                                 
44 From the equilibrium equations under individual bargaining, the individual bargaining 
markup is found as 
1
11
1 −
−+=−
−
σ
φ
σ
φσ . 
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may also have contributed to the second phase of the run-up in stock prices. Indeed, in 
his famed remarks on the eve of Black Thursday, Irving Fisher attributed the rise in 
the stock market to the lax anti-trust policies of the Coolidge and Hoover administra-
tions.45  
Hence, we pin down the demand elasticity at the peak of the stock market run 
up as that value which is necessary to justify the peak stock market valuation under 
individual bargaining.. These values are given in Table 4 below. 
 
 S&P S&P Δ Implied σ Dow Dow Δ Implied σ 
Peak 1914:Q3 100   100   
Trough 1921:Q3 53.0 - 47.0 % 2.6 72.3 -27.7 % 4.0 
Peak 1929:3 123.0 + 130.1 % 2.2 185.1 +156.0 % 2.4 
 
Table 4: Calibrating demand elasticity to asset price movements.  
 
                                                 
45 In its October 24, 1929 edition, the New York Times writes: He (Fisher) gave as one rea-
son why security values were so high, “that we are living in the age of mergers under the 
Coolidge and Hoover administrations, and the old ‘trust-busting’ sentiment has lapsed al-
most completely,…” 
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Figure 3:  Equilibrium value of collective bargaining firms as a fraction of their value under 
individual bargaining when agents expect that regimes will be permanent. 
 
In order to generate asset price increases reaching the Dow’s 1929:3 peak, a decrease 
in demand elasticity to 2.4 by the fall of 1929 is necessary in the model. Demand elas-
ticity of 2.4 corresponds to a markup of 35.7%. In order for a switch in bargaining 
regime and an increase in monopoly power to jointly account for the S&P’s 1929:3 
peak, demand elasticity must have fallen to 2.2 by the fall of 1929, corresponding to a 
markup of 41.7%. Once again, both of these markup values are well within the range 
of markups estimated for post-war US data by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995), sug-
gesting that such markups might well have been plausible.  
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Figure 4:  Impact on asset prices of regime switches between individual and collective wage 
bargaining in a model of monopolistic competition with search frictions in labor 
markets 
 
C. Interwar Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
Figures 5 to 7 present data on key macroeconomic variables over the period between 
1913 (the last full year before passage and enactment of the Clayton Act) and 1934 
(the beginning of the New Deal). We identify three clear regimes. First, between 1914 
and 1921, GNP and the investment-output ratio are substantially below trend46. Al-
though the picture is blurred by the impact of World War I, we find it reasonable to 
view this period as one in which output was about 10% below trend.47 The behavior 
of investment is in line with such a drop in output, as the investment-output ratio 
                                                 
46 We use Kendrick’s measures of real private non-farm GNP and private investment. 
47 The exception is GNP in 1916, at the height of the war effort, which is close to trend. 
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drops sharply over this period, from about 0.20 in 1913 to a post-war low of 0.13 in 
1921.  
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Figure 5:  Real Private Non-Farm GNP as % of Trend, 1913-1940 
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Figure 6: Investment-to-Output Ratio, 1913-1940 
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Figure 7: Unemployment Rates, 1913-1930 
 
Figure 7 shows that unemployment also rises during this period, with the exception of 
the years 1916-19, during which the impact of World War I on the labor force would 
have been strongest.  
By the same token, we see a connection between the Supreme Court’s neu-
tralization of the Clayton Act’s pro-union provisions in late 1921 and the subsequent 
economic recovery. Investment and asset prices reacted immediately, while the saluta-
tory effects on output were not fully felt until 1923. We identify a second regime, 
from 1922 to 1929, during which output is at trend, the investment-output once again 
approaches 0.20 and unemployment is low, hovering around 5%.  
The third regime begins in 1930, with the onset of the Great Depression and 
the accompanying spike in unemployment rates. After dropping to less than 60% of 
trend in 1933, output remains at about 80% of trend until the beginning of the Second 
World War. We relate the onset of the Great Depression to expectations that the in-
creasingly organized labor-friendly judicial and legislative environment would lead to 
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a switch back to a low-output and high-unemployment collective bargaining regime . 
Similarly to Ohanian (2006), we argue that firms offered workers wage- employment 
pairs that were similar to collective bargaining outcomes, in order to preempt unions 
from reorganizing.  
The next challenge for our model framework is to examine the quantitative 
implications of a switch in bargaining regimes from collective to individual and an 
increase in monopoly power on the behavior of output and unemployment, and to 
compare these model predictions with the three regimes identified in the data. In the 
experiments, we use the demand elasticities which are pinned down by asset price 
movements, as detailed in the previous subsection.  
Our first quantitative question is: Can the switch from individual to collective 
bargaining due to the pro-union Clayton Act account for the decline in output and in-
crease in unemployment observed? When demand elasticity has been pinned down by 
the Dow at 4.0, a switch from individual to collective bargaining would imply a de-
crease in output of 17 % and an increase in unemployment from 5.5% to 21.4 %, as 
illustrated in the top panels of Figure 8. Hence, when demand elasticity (monopoly 
power) is chosen so that the model is able to fully explain the stock index movements, 
the model matches the decline in output quite well, while overstating the increase in 
unemployment. In particular, real private non-farm per capita GNP was at most 
16.0% below a 2% trend extrapolated from 1913, and unemployment increased either 
by 3.8 (Romer) or by 7.4 percentage points (Lebergott). 48 
                                                 
48 Although both Lebergott and Romer take great care in constructing their unemployment 
estimates, it should be noted that comprehensive data on unemployment of post-war quality 
is simply not available for this period.  
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Figure 8:  Regime switches between individual and collective wage bargaining in a model 
of monopolistic competition with search frictions in labor markets 
 
Now let us turn attention to our interpretation of the 1922 to 1929 expansion as being 
due to a combination of a shift in the bargaining regime from collective back to indi-
vidual bargaining and an increase in monopoly power. Between the trough of 1921 
and 1926, real per capita GNP climbed by about 16%, beginning at 86% of trend in 
1921 and rejoining the trend extrapolated from 1913 in 1926. This is quite similar to 
the output increase of about 19 % predicted by the model when both the bargaining 
regime switches from collective to individual and demand elasticity declines to 2.4. 
Unemployment also drops sharply in the data, decreasing from nearly 12 % to just 
over 2% between 1921 and 1923 (according to Lebergott) or from 8.7% to 4.8% (ac-
cording to Romer). Our model predicts that unemployment returns to a level of 6.2 %.  
From 1926 to 1928, real per capita GNP stagnated, dipping about 4% below 
trend again, while asset prices continued their upward climb. This is consistent with 
an increase in monopoly power under individual bargaining, as illustrated in the top 
panels of Figure 8. Under individual bargaining, an increase in monopoly power 
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should both drive asset values up and cause real output to stagnate, consistent with the 
behavior of the US economy in the period 1926-2849. An increase in monopoly power 
during the 1920s will also set the stage for the Great Depression, as it will increase the 
impact on profits and output of an expected or realized switch from individual to col-
lective bargaining. 
To summarize, we find the model predictions to be quite consistent with the 
accepted stylized facts on the American economy during the interwar years50. 
 
D. Speculations on real origins of the Great Depression 
In Sections IV B and C, we established that the run-up in asset prices, accompanied 
by stagnant output, during the late 1920s is consistent with an increase in monopoly 
power under individual bargaining. In order to account for the all of the increases in 
HP-trend stock-prices, demand elasticity would have to have decreased from about 
4.0 to 2.5, corresponding to an increase in markups from 17 % to 33 %.51 An expected 
switch to collective bargaining at such a high degree of monopoly power would have 
catastrophic consequences for output and unemployment, as illustrated by the top 
panels of Figure 8. A switch to collective bargaining when demand elasticity is 2.5 
would cause output to drop by 38 %, and unemployment to increase by 36 percentage 
points to 42.2%. Hence, the model matches the severity of the output decline and the 
increase in unemployment in the Great Depression very well.  
                                                 
49 An increase in monopoly power during the 1920s has been documented by Keller (1973), 
as discussed earlier in the present paper. 
50 For a typical account from the vast older literature, see Schlesinger (1964). 
51 In order to account for the full stock market boom up to October 1929 in the raw data, de-
mand elasticity would have to fall below 1.5, equivalent to an increase in mark-ups in ex-
cess of 100 %. Hence, by calibrating to the HP-trend rather than the raw values, we choose 
conservative estimates for the increase in monopoly power. 
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Although the expansion of collective bargaining on a large scale commences 
in the 1930s, after the enactment of the NRA and Wagner Acts, there is good reason 
to believe that in the late 1920s, the writing for this imminent regime switch was al-
ready on the wall , as laid out in Section III above. At the same time, there is ample 
evidence (cf Hanes (1996)) that real wages were increasing during the early years of 
the great depression. As Ohanian (2006) emphasizes, such wage increases were part 
of a drive by the Hoover administration to introduce welfare capitalism schemes. 
The previous section has discussed recent findings relating these schemes to 
the desire to maintain a union-free shop. In our model economy, this behavior is ra-
tionalized by the attempt of firms to preempt union formation by offering higher 
wages and restricting hiring, mimicking the outcome of collective bargaining, as de-
scribed in detail in Section III. This mimicking behavior would also be consistent with 
the evidence of such schemes losing significance as mandatory collective bargaining 
was introduced. Recent research discussed in the previous section has deemphasized 
the effects of the NRA and the Wagner Act on the relative position of labor by point-
ing to the substitution of private with public welfare programs. This is exactly in line 
with our model’s predictions.  
The picture we obtain is one of an anticipated end to the artificial boom of the 
1920s, once word spread that the weakening of America’s trade unions, and hence its 
exceptionalism in labor relations, would only be temporary. In general equilibrium 
with monopolistic competition, this anticipation may be captured as a regime switch 
from an equilibrium with individual wage bargaining to another one with collective 
wage bargaining, as described above. The imminent increase in union power at the 
end of the 1920s would then have led to adjustments in expectations. In particular, 
expectations of reduced profits under collective bargaining would have caused a drop 
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in stock market valuations of firms, while expectations of lower future output levels 
and higher wages would lead firms to cut back drastically on investment and to lay off 
workers. All of these are phenomena that are associated with the onset of the Great 
Depression. 
 
E. A counterfactual 
The results from this section also provide a policy counterfactual for a more favorable 
trajectory. Bittlingmayer (1992) mentions the possible announcement effects on the 
1929 stock market of an intended tightening in antitrust policy, which in the end did 
not materialize. While we agree that more effective antitrust enforcement could in-
deed have contributed to falling stock market prices, the effects on the business cycle 
would have been highly beneficial. To see this, consider a counterfactual in Figure 8 
under which the degree of competition in the U.S. economy had increased. Beginning 
on the individual bargaining locus of the early 1920s, the economy would have 
evolved along the individual bargaining scheme towards the right, eating away at mo-
nopoly profits and reducing the incentive for labor to organize. The output and em-
ployment gains would have been modest, while the drop in profits would have been 
considerable. Hence, had Hoover truly implemented his threats to strengthen anti-trust 
enforcement, then the stock market might still have crashed, but with scant conse-
quences for output and unemployment.  
Even if the increase in competition had been unsuccessful at preventing in-
creased pressure by organized labor for the right to bargain collectively, the counter-
factual scenario would have been relatively favorable. Moving Northeast from the far 
left of the individual bargaining locus to a point corresponding to greater competition 
on the collective bargaining locus would have led to a more moderate decrease in out-
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put and a more modest increase in unemployment, despite a somewhat sharper fall in 
stock market valuations. Our equilibrium model has the clear implication that strict 
antitrust policy would have been the preferred way for the U.S. economy to get out of 
the recession, both for 1921 and post-1929. 
 Our results are reminiscent of a policy dilemma for the New Dealers described 
and analyzed in Cole and Ohanian (2004) for the 1930s. Policy makers in the 1930s 
employed the threat of stricter antitrust enforcement as a lever to push through with a 
high-wage collective bargaining setting. Cole and Ohanian show how this policy con-
tributed to the persistence of unemployment and slowed down the speed of recovery. 
Very much the same bad policy choices had already been made in the late 1920s, 
where again, leniency in antitrust enforcement combined with high-wage doctrines, 
attempting to cure the evil of monopoly power in goods markets with the evil of mo-
nopoly power in labor markets. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the interplay of monopoly power in goods markets and bar-
gaining regimes in labor markets in the 1920s and their possible effects on the Ameri-
can business cycle between 1920 and 1930. In the Ebell and Haefke (2005) frame-
work of monopolistic competition between producers and search frictions in the labor 
market, we identified individual and collective wage bargaining as two relevant wage 
bargaining regimes. We interpreted the violent swings in business activity at the be-
ginning and the end of the decade as regime switches between different bargaining 
modes. We saw the intermediate period as characterized by stable, if repressive, labor 
market institutions and rising corporate profits, and related these to increases in mo-
nopoly power due to lax anti-trust policies during the Coolidge administration. 
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In this paper, we also briefly reviewed evidence on U.S. labor and antitrust 
history of the 1920s, and argued from prominent court cases that there is evidence for 
rapidly mounting pressure to reunionize at the end of the decade. With these court rul-
ings, a decade-long blockade against pro-union legislation was lifted, signaling an end 
to the American exceptionalism in labor relations that had characterized the early 20th 
century. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any of the laws from the 1930s that regulated 
labor relations could have passed muster as constitutional without these landmark 
court decisions of 1927-30. 
Our view of the two severe depressions surrounding the 1920s is also consis-
tent with the stylized facts on the American economy during that period. We argue 
that recovery from the 1920 recession was facilitated by Supreme Court rulings that 
curbed collective wage bargaining quite effectively, while monopoly power in prod-
uct markets grew steadily throughout the decade. As a consequence of rising monop-
oly power, profits would tend to increase further after a ceiling in output and em-
ployment had been reached, which seems to describe the evidence from the 1920s 
very well. We also see reversal of Supreme Court jurisdiction towards unions in the 
late 1920s and the expected end of the repression of trade unions as a major contribut-
ing factor in the collapse of profit and output expectations at the end of the decade.  
Our model predicts a decline in output by nearly 40%, while unemployment 
would increase from a 5 percent natural rate to over 40 percent. These predictions are 
well in line with the well-known stylized facts on the slump in output, employment, 
and stock prices during the Great Depression. This also implies that we see the bulk of 
the stock market rise and decline of the late 1920s, not as a bubble but rather as a ra-
tional response to expected changes in the wage bargaining and anti-trust environ-
ments that indeed materialized.  
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Our analysis also highlights the policy choices of decision makers at the time. 
Policy makers perceived a trade-off between laxity in antitrust policy and leniency 
toward trade unions. Cole and Ohanian (2004) have prominently made the case for the 
1930s, arguing forcefully that the purportedly pro-business, pro-union attitudes during 
the New Deal led to protracted unemployment and delayed recovery. Evidence sug-
gests that the same policy trade-offs were perceived already during the 1920s, and the 
same bad policy choices were made. As a consequence, the same principal mecha-
nisms that underlie the incomplete recovery of the 1930s apply already to the early 
phase of the Great Depression.  
This also gives rise to a counterfactual about a different set of possible policy 
choices. We find that stricter antitrust enforcement could at all times have helped al-
leviate the inefficiencies generated by monopoly power and wage bargaining, both 
under individual bargaining and in the presence of unions. In both cases, employment 
and output would have increased, and the wedge between collective and individual 
bargaining been reduced to the point where hardly any monopoly profits were left 
over that unions could have preyed on. Throughout the interwar period, policy took a 
different course, sending the U.S. economy on a roller coaster of the most violent 
business fluctuations experienced in the 20th century. 
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Appendix A1: Solving the Differential Equation 
 
The differential equation to be solved is: 
( ) ( ) ( )11
1
I I
I I U I
I
p y wrw h V A h
r P h
σφ φ σ
⎡ ⎤∂−= − + −⎢ ⎥+ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
The solution method is standard, and this exposition follows Cahuc, Marque and 
Wasmer (2004). Begin by noting that one can initially disregard the constant terms 
(those terms which do not depend upon h ), and simply add them back in later. Hence, 
we are looking for a solution to: 
( ) ( )1 I II I I
I
p y ww h A h
P h
σφ φσ
∂−= − ∂    (A1.1) 
Rearranging slightly and using the demand function facing the firm to substitute out 
for ( )Ip y
P
 yields: 
   
( ) ( )
11
1 1
1
1 0I I I
I I
w h w A h
h h Y
σ
σ
σ
σ
φ σ
−
− −∂ −+ − =∂   (A1.2) 
Next, write down the homogeneous version: 
( ) 0I I
I I
w h w
h hφ
∂+ =∂     (A1.3) 
which has the well known solution 
( ) 1I Iw h Kh φ−=     (A1.4) 
Take the derivative of (A1.4), using the fact that K  may depend upon Ih : 
1 111I
I I
I I
w KK h h
h h
φ φ
φ
− − −∂ ∂= − +∂ ∂     (A1.5) 
Now, substitute (A1.4) and (A1.5) back into (A1.2) to obtain: 
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( )
11
1 11
1
1
I
I
K A h
h Y
σ
σ φ
σ
σ
σ
−
− − +∂ −=∂     (A1.6) 
Taking the integral over both sides of (A1.6) yields 
( )
1
11
I
AhK A h J
Y
σ
φσφ σ φ
−− ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠    (A1.7) 
where J  is a constant of integration. Now substitute (A1.7) into (A1.4) to obtain 
( ) ( ) 11 II I Ip yw h A JhP φ
σφ σ φ
−−= +−    (A1.8) 
Finally, we need to pin down J  using a terminal condition. Following Cahuc, et. al. 
(2004), we choose the condition that 0lim 0Ih I Ih w→ = , that is, the firm-level bargained 
wage should not explode as firm-level employment Ih  approaches zero. This implies 
that 0J = . Adding back the constant terms yields the solution to the differential equa-
tion (10): 
( ) ( ) ( )11
1
I
I I U
p yrw h V A
r P
σφ φ σ φ
−= − ++ −                   (12) 
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Appendix A.2: Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition 1: There exists no wage-employment pair (wP,hP) such that both firms 
and workers are at least as well off as under collective bargaining, that is, such that  
( ) ( ), ,P P C Cw h w hπ π≥      (A2.1) 
, ,E P U P E C U CV V h V V h⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ≥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦     (A2.2) 
where ( ),w hπ  are the firm’s profits under wage-employment pair ( ),w h . 
Proof: From the definition of worker’s surplus (4), (A2.2) is equivalent to: 
( ) ( )1 1P U P C U Cr w rV h r w rV h⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − ≥ + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦    (A2.3) 
Assume that the preemptive wage involves a surplus which differs from the CB sur-
plus by a factor 1γ ≠ , so that  
( ) ( )1 1P U C Ur w rV r w rVγ ⎡ ⎤+ − = + −⎣ ⎦    (A2.4) 
 and (A2.3) becomes 
P Ch hγ ≥      (A2.5) 
Hence, workers are just indifferent between pairs (wP,hP) and (wC,hC) if 
1
P Ch hγ= . In 
order for the preemptive pair to be strictly preferable for firms, it must be the case 
that (A2.1) is satisfied, which is equivalent to: 
( )
( )
( )
( )P CP P P C C C
p h p h
A w h h A w h h
P q P q
κχ κχ
θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − > − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (A2.6) 
Substituting in from (A2.4) and (A2.5) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1P C U
p h p h rA A V
P P r q
κχγ γ θ
⎡ ⎤− > − +⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (A2.7) 
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Substituting in from the firm’s demand function ( )
1
p h y
P Y
σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and from (A2.5) leads 
to 
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
U
C
r V
r q
p y
A
P
σ κχγγ θ
γ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥>− ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (A2.8) 
Finally, using (11) to substitute out for the right-hand side of (A2.8) yields a condition 
under which a preemptive pair ( ),P Pw h  is strictly improving for the firm while keep-
ing workers indifferent: 
      
1
1
1
σγ γ σ
γ σ
− −>−    (A2.9) 
First take 1σ = : (A2.9) holds with equality everywhere. First take the case that 1γ > . 
In order to establish that (A2.9) does not hold for 1γ > , if suffices to show that in-
creasing σ  causes the RHS to increase, but the LHS to decrease. The latter is clearly 
the case, while the former holds due to 2
1
1 0
σ
σ
σ σ
−∂
= >∂ .  
Next, note that (A2.9) must hold with equality in the limit as 1γ → . (It is straightfor-
ward to confirm this using l’Hopital’s rule.) In order to establish that (A2.9) does not 
hold for 1γ < , it suffices to show that the LHS is increasing in γ : 
( )
( )
1
1 11
2
11 1
1 0
1
σ σ σγ γ γ γ γ γσγ
γ γ
−⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞− − − + −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠= >∂ −  
whenever   
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( ) 1 11 111 1 1 0σ σγ γ γ γσ
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞− − + − >⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
    (A2.10) 
(A2.10) holds with equality when 1σ = . To establish our claim, it suffices to show 
that the derivative of (A2.10) with respect to σ  is positive. The derivative of (A2.10) 
with respect to σ  is: 
( ) 1 11 21 11 ln 0σ σγ γ γ γσ σ
−⎡ ⎤ −− + >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Since 1γ <  implies that ln 0γ < , the inequality clearly holds for 1γ < .  
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